fwd: ‘Ghost’ prisoners Is the U.S. outsourcing torture?

The answer to the question they ask below seems to be, tragically, “yes.” It is
hard to internalize. I think that is the reason that most Americans are not
alarmed. So many of the differences among us have to be over what we think is
“true.” I have many friends who, if they really believed this was going on,
would be outraged. They are that kind of people. But so far, they don’t really
believe it — or at least it has not sunk in to them that our government now
countenances torture and even “outsources” it to rogue states like Syria. RLCPlease see my “concerns” page:
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~canfrobt/Concerns
My blog: http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/Forwarded Message:

From: “Zalmai M.”
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: ‘Ghost’ prisoners Is the U.S. outsourcing torture?
Date: Feb 27, 2005
–>
>
> Sacramento Bee
> February 26, 2005, Saturday METRO FINAL EDITION
> prisoners Is the U.S. outsourcing torture?
>
> U.S.-born Ahmed Omar Abu Ali spent 20 months in prison without charge
> in Saudi Arabia before he was suddenly flown to the United States the
> other day to face charges that he abetted terrorist groups and
> conspired to kill President Bush.
>
> Abu Ali, who was studying in Saudi Arabia when he was arrested,
> denies the charges. It’s unclear that the government has a strong
> case against him, since the only known witness to the alleged plot
> was killed in a shootout with Saudi police more than a year ago.
>
> Why, after such a long delay, has the Justice Department suddenly
> decided to prosecute? One reason may be that its hand was forced by
> Abu Ali’s parents, who filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking their
> son’s release and claiming he had been tortured.
>
> The judge hearing the suit at least partly supported that claim. He
> rejected the government’s request for dismissal, saying there was “at
> least some circumstantial evidence that Abu Ali has been tortured
> during interrogations with the knowledge of the United States.”
>
> However this case ends, the circumstances surrounding Abu Ali’s
> detention raise again troubling questions about some of the Bush
> administration’s tactics in its pursuit of terrorists, specifically,
> its use of “rendition” – turning over terror suspects to other
> countries for interrogation and, say some critics, U.S.-condoned
> torture.
>
> Who these “ghost” prisoners are, how many there are, where they are
> being held and exactly what crimes they are believed to have
> committed is a mystery, at least to the public. It’s widely believed,
> however, that those “rendered” are being held by countries with
> reputations for harsh treatment of prisoners. Saudi Arabia is a prime
> example, and in this case it appears to have acted on Washington’s
> behalf from the outset.
>
> What’s especially troubling about this case is that it comes amid
> growing revelations about the atrocious treatment of U.S.-held
> prisoners in Iraq and at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba.
> Although the full extent of this scandal is not yet known, what is
> known is so damning that each new charge against an alleged terrorist
> raises justifiable suspicions about the truthfulness of the charges.
>
> Someday, one must hope, a full, impartial investigation will cast
> much more light on how U.S. authorities have treated those arrested
> in the wake of the 9/11 attacks – from the dragnet-like roundup of
> Muslim men in this country, to those captured on the battlefield in
> Afghanistan and Iraq, to Americans of Arab descent, such as Abu Ali,
> accused of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism. One must also hope
> that that investigation will pursue the evidence as far as it goes –
> including, if it comes to that, all the way to the top.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ********************************************************************
> Please inform those interested in Afghanistan to join the
> Afghaniyat Listserver Newsgroup, Afghanistan’s Largest Email
> Newsgroup with over 3600 members worldwide.
>
> By joining the server, you will recieve “One Daily Digest” containing
> news articles, essays, announcements from Afghanistan officials, international
experts,and Afghans worldwide.
> ===================================================================
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> Send an email to: afghaniyat-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
> *********************************************************************
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
> To visit your group on the web, go to:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/afghaniyat/
>
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
> afghaniyat-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
> http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
>
>
>

fwd: The World; A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout;

The more we know about A. Q. Khan, hero of Pakistan, the more dangerous he
appears to be. RLCPlease see my “concerns” page:
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~canfrobt/Concerns
My blog: http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/Forwarded Message:

From: “Zalmai M.”
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: The World; A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout;
Date: Feb 27, 2005
–>
>
> Los Angeles Times
> February 27, 2005
> The World; A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout;
> The U.S. took too long to act, some experts say, letting a Pakistani
> scientist sell illicit technology well after it knew of his operation.
> By Douglas Frantz
>
>
> Nuclear warhead plans that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan sold
> to Libya were more complete and detailed than previously disclosed,
> raising new concerns about the cost of Washington’s watch-and-wait
> policy before Khan and his global black market were shut down last year.
>
> Two Western nuclear weapons specialists who have examined the
> top-secret designs say the hundreds of pages of engineering drawings
> and handwritten notes provide an excellent starting point for anyone
> trying to develop an effective atomic warhead.
>
> “This involved the spread of very sensitive nuclear knowledge, and it
> is the most serious form of proliferation,” one of the specialists
> said. Both described the designs on condition that their names be
> withheld because the plans are classified.
>
> The sale of the plans is particularly troubling to some investigators
> because the transaction occurred at least 18 months after U.S. and
> British intelligence agencies concluded that Khan was running an
> international nuclear smuggling ring and identified Libya as a
> suspected customer, according to U.S. officials and a British
> government assessment.
>
> Interviews with current and former government officials and
> intelligence agents and outside experts in Washington, Europe and the
> Middle East reveal a lengthy pattern of watching and waiting when it
> came to Khan and his illicit network.
>
> The trail dated back more than 20 years as Khan went from a secretive
> procurer of technology for Pakistan’s atomic weapons program, which he
> headed, to history’s biggest independent seller of nuclear weapons
> equipment and expertise.
>
> For most of those years, Khan’s primary customers were Iran and North
> Korea. In 2002, President Bush said the countries were part of an
> “axis of evil,” in part because of nuclear programs nourished by Khan
> and his network.
>
> Despite knowing at least the broad outlines of Khan’s activities,
> American intelligence agencies regularly objected to shutting down his
> operations. And policymakers in Washington repeatedly prioritized
> other strategic goals over stopping him, according to current and
> former officials.
>
> Some officials said that even as the picture of the threat posed by
> Khan’s operation got clearer and bigger in 2000 and 2001, the
> intelligence was too limited to act on.
>
> Other officials said the CIA and the National Security Agency, which
> eavesdropped on Khan’s communications, were so addicted to gathering
> information and so worried about compromising their electronic sources
> that they rebuffed efforts to roll up the operation for years.
>
> “We could have stopped the Khan network, as we knew it, at any time,”
> said Robert J. Einhorn, a top counter-proliferation official at the
> State Department from 1991 to August 2001. “The debate was, do you
> stop it now or do you watch it and understand it better so that you
> are in a stronger position to pull it up by the roots later? The case
> for waiting prevailed.”
>
> Current and former Bush administration officials say the patience paid
> off. They say that in late 2003, combined U.S. and British
> intelligence on Khan finally yielded enough information to persuade
> Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi to relinquish his nuclear technology and
> turn over conclusive evidence used to shut down the Pakistani
> scientist, who by then had been removed as head of his nation’s
> primary nuclear laboratory.
>
> “A.Q. Khan is a textbook case of government doing things right,” John
> S. Wolf, then assistant secretary of State for nonproliferation, said
> when Kadafi gave up his nuclear equipment.
>
> Others say that the price of patience was too high, emphasizing that
> for years Khan fed the nuclear ambitions of countries that the U.S.
> says have ties to terrorism and pose major foreign policy problems.
>
> “I don’t see what was gained by waiting,” said George Perkovich, a
> nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International
> Peace in Washington. “Iran got centrifuge equipment and knowledge at
> the very least, and possibly a weapons design. We don’t even know what
> North Korea got.”
>
> An American diplomat in Europe was more blunt, saying, “It’s
> absolutely shocking that Khan spread nuclear knowledge while he was
> being watched.”
>
> As a global inquiry into Khan’s network enters its second year,
> investigators from several countries and the United Nations’
> International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna are trying to answer two
> vital questions — how much damage did Khan do and how did he stay in
> business for so long?
>
> The challenge has been made tougher by Pakistan’s refusal to allow
> outside investigators to question Khan, who is under house arrest in
> Islamabad, and because his network began systematically shredding
> papers and deleting e-mails in the summer of 2002, after realizing it
> was under surveillance.
>
> Investigators said the previously undisclosed destruction of records
> is making it harder to discover whether the network sold its deadly
> wares, including the warhead plans, to as yet unidentified countries
> or even extremist organizations. It also increases the chances that
> remnants of the ring will re-emerge. “Regrettably, they had a long
> time to destroy evidence,” said a senior investigator who had
> interviewed members of the network. “They knew they were being watched.”
>
> A detailed chronology of the long history of Khan and the spies who
> watched him, based on extensive interviews and hundreds of pages of
> public and confidential records, provides an unusual look at the
> inherent tension between gathering intelligence and taking action,
> which allowed the scientist and his network of engineers and middlemen
> to operate unchecked.
>
> *
>
> Path to Deception
>
> Abdul Qadeer Khan, believed to have been born in India in 1935, moved
> with his family to Pakistan in 1952 in the aftermath of ethnic
> violence in India. He was a bright student whose studies took him to
> Europe, where he eventually received a doctorate in metallurgy.
>
> In May 1972, Khan started work for an engineering firm in Amsterdam
> that was a major subcontractor for Urenco, a British-Dutch-German
> consortium founded two years earlier to develop advanced centrifuges
> to enrich uranium for civilian power plants.
>
> Though he was supposed to work only with material labeled
> confidential, over the next 3 1/2 years Khan got access to top-secret
> dossiers on every aspect of the enrichment process, according to a
> lengthy report prepared last year by Dutch anti-nuclear activists.
>
> When he returned to Pakistan in December 1975 with his Dutch wife,
> Hendrina, and their two daughters, ostensibly for a holiday, he
> carried with him designs he had copied while working in the
> Netherlands, intelligence and law enforcement authorities said.
>
> His timing was excellent. Pakistan had fought wars in 1965 and 1971
> with neighboring India and the two countries were locked in a race to
> develop nuclear weapons.
>
> Khan mailed his resignation letter to Amsterdam and quickly assumed a
> primary role in the Pakistani government’s nuclear program, which
> would succeed in testing its first bombs in 1998 partly because of
> Khan’s skills.
>
> Initially, he served under the nation’s atomic energy commission, but
> he bristled at the constraints and won the right to work without
> official oversight.
>
> “He asked for and received autonomy and an unlimited budget,” said
> Feroz Khan, a retired Pakistani brigadier general and nuclear expert
> who is not related to A.Q. Khan. “There was no accountability.”
>
> Enriching natural uranium to weapons grade is a complicated process
> requiring huge arrays of slim cylinders called centrifuges and
> sophisticated machinery to regulate them as they spin at twice the
> speed of sound.
>
> Pakistan did not have the material to manufacture the delicately
> balanced centrifuges or much of the other equipment required, so Khan
> used his outsize budget to establish a clandestine procurement network.
>
> The first purchases were from companies associated with Urenco and
> were orchestrated through Pakistani embassies in Europe in 1976,
> creating what became known as the Pakistani pipeline.
>
> Alarm bells rang in 1978 after a British company sold Pakistan
> high-frequency electronic devices used in the enrichment process. The
> ensuing investigations pointed at Khan, according to media reports at
> the time.
>
> President Jimmy Carter cut off U.S. assistance to Pakistan in April
> 1979 when it was discovered that Khan had stolen plans from Urenco and
> was using them in Pakistan’s nuclear effort.
>
> But the U.S. sanctions were short-lived. The Soviet invasion of
> Afghanistan later that year pushed counter-proliferation concerns to
> the back burner and lowered the heat on Khan and Pakistan for the next
> decade. During that period, Islamabad was the principal conduit for
> huge amounts of U.S. aid to anti-Soviet fighters in neighboring
> Afghanistan.
>
> The Dutch were unable to prove that Khan stole the designs, but in
> 1983 he was convicted in absentia of writing two letters seeking
> classified nuclear information. The conviction was overturned because
> he never received a proper summons.
>
> A former CIA agent who worked in the region said the Reagan
> administration had “incontrovertible” knowledge of Pakistan’s progress
> toward the bomb and Khan’s central role in procuring material, but
> chose not to act.
>
> The pattern and priorities had been established. Throughout the 1980s,
> the Reagan and Bush administrations sent $600 million a year in
> military and economic assistance to Pakistan for its help on
> Afghanistan, according to a report last month by the Congressional
> Research Service.
>
> Not until the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan did the first
> President Bush reimpose sanctions on Pakistan, in 1990, for developing
> atomic weapons.
>
> But U.S. intelligence had not lost complete sight of Khan. The CIA was
> told in 1989 that the Pakistani scientist was providing centrifuge
> designs and parts to Iran, said two former U.S. officials who read the
> reports.
>
> Not for the first time, however, U.S. intelligence officials and
> policymakers underestimated Khan’s talent for spreading nuclear know-how.
>
> “We knew he traveled a lot, but we thought it was probably related to
> imports rather than exports,” said Einhorn, who read about the Iran
> link when he joined the State Department nonproliferation bureau in
> 1991. “We thought the Iran connection had fallen off during the 1990s
> and that Iran was mainly looking to Russia rather than Pakistan for
> its nuclear supplies.”
>
> In fact, Khan started providing material to Iran in 1987 and continued
> as its primary nuclear supplier for at least a decade, recent reports
> by the International Atomic Energy Agency state. As demand for his
> wares grew, he turned for help to many of the companies and engineers
> supplying Pakistan.
>
> *
>
> Tapping Old Contacts
>
> The network was a sort of old boys club from Urenco. It included
> Dutch, German and Swiss members, former Urenco subcontractors who had
> gotten rich helping Khan turn Pakistan into a nuclear power.
>
> But rivalries developed within the group as orders from Iran slowed in
> the mid-1990s, and Khan, even as he ran Pakistan’s enrichment
> facilities, tried to expand his illicit sales to other countries,
> investigators said.
>
> “Some guys got along and some guys didn’t,” said an investigator who
> spoke on condition of anonymity. “A.Q. dealt with them individually.
> There were some group meetings, but there was never a meeting of all
> the major players at once.”
>
> Khan developed a particularly close friendship with B.S.A. Tahir, a
> Sri Lankan businessman who eventually turned his computer business in
> Dubai into the network’s operational base. The two men traveled
> together frequently and twice made the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca,
> Saudi Arabia.
>
> Khan visited at least a dozen countries in the Middle East and Africa
> in search of new customers for the network, but nuclear weapons proved
> a harder sell than he had imagined, investigators said.
>
> In 1997, he got a cold reception when he told an audience of
> scientists and military officers in Damascus that Syria should acquire
> its own nuclear weapons to counter Israel’s arsenal, said a former
> Syrian official who attended the talk.
>
> But that same year he appeared to strike it rich. At a series of
> meetings in Istanbul, Turkey, and Casablanca, Morocco, he made a deal
> to sell Libya a complete bomb-making factory for approximately $100
> million.
>
> This appears to have been the network’s biggest transaction, and it
> led Khan to take a risk and expand beyond the original participants
> and his own safe base in Pakistan.
>
> The Libya deal was taking shape just as Khan reaped enormous benefits
> at home. On May 28, 1998, the desert of southwestern Pakistan rumbled
> deeply as five nuclear weapons were detonated. It was Pakistan’s first
> nuclear test and it answered India’s detonation of three bombs two
> weeks earlier.
>
> Already a powerful figure, Khan basked in nationwide adulation as he
> was dubbed the father of the Islamic bomb, a title that many experts
> say exaggerated his role. Still, he boasted in an interview with a
> Pakistani magazine about evading efforts to stop him and exploiting
> Western greed.
>
> “Many suppliers approached us with the details of the machinery and
> with the figures and numbers of instruments and materials,” he said.
> “They begged us to purchase their goods.”
>
> Even with his role in making nuclear weapons now in the open, Khan
> continued to quietly make deals with other nations. In late 1998, U.S.
> intelligence picked up evidence that he was trading enrichment
> technology to North Korea in return for missiles capable of carrying
> nuclear warheads into India, a former senior U.S. official who read
> the reports said.
>
> The suspicions were added to a growing, highly classified chronology
> of Khan’s actions kept at the State Department, said another former
> senior official.
>
> In January 1999, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott raised the
> North Korean deal at a lunch in Islamabad with then-Pakistani Prime
> Minister Nawaz Sharif. He asked Sharif to stop the illicit trade in
> nuclear technology and end the deals with Pyongyang, Talbott wrote in
> his 2004 book “Engaging India.” A second U.S. official who attended
> the meeting corroborated the account.
>
> Though Talbott did not mention Khan by name, the second official said
> it was clear that Talbott was talking about Khan when he asked for a
> halt to the nuclear proliferation and the deals with North Korea,
> which intelligence data showed were being handled directly by Khan
> through his research laboratory in Pakistan.
>
> “It is true that Pakistan has important defense cooperation with North
> Korea, but it is for conventional military equipment,” Sharif replied,
> according to the second official. “Nothing nuclear is taking place.”
>
> Former Pakistani officials said the Americans never provided hard
> information that could have led to action against Khan, though critics
> argue that the scientist could not have conducted his business without
> at least a wink and a nod from Pakistan’s military establishment.
>
> “They were very vague warnings and there was no real evidence or we
> would have acted,” Feroz Khan, the former Pakistani brigadier general
> who is a visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in
> Monterey, Calif., said in a telephone interview.
>
> The situation for Abdul Qadeer Khan began to deteriorate after Sharif
> was ousted in a coup in October 1999 by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the
> head of the armed forces.
>
> Aides to Musharraf said he tried almost immediately to assert control
> over the country’s nuclear establishment, including imposing the first
> audit requirements on Khan Research Laboratory, the government complex
> renamed after him that was his base of operations.
>
> Khan resisted and Musharraf ultimately forced him out as head of the
> lab, though he lavished praise on Khan at his retirement banquet,
> saying his team had “sweated, day and night, against all odds and
> obstacles, against international sanctions and sting operations, to
> create, literally out of nothing, with their bare hands, the pride of
> Pakistan’s nuclear capability.”
>
> The unprecedented restrictions at home coincided with increasing
> demand for centrifuges and other goods for Libya’s bomb-making
> factory. Khan responded by finding new sources of equipment in South
> Africa and Malaysia.
>
> Pakistan was known in U.S. intelligence circles as a “hard target,”
> which meant penetrating Khan’s inner circle and his facilities there
> was extremely difficult. Pakistani authorities were aware of U.S.
> interest in their nuclear facilities and took steps to protect them
> and their scientists.
>
> The shift to other locations for production created a new
> vulnerability that was quickly exploited by the U.S., most likely by
> eavesdropping on phone calls and monitoring e-mail.
>
> “We were inside his residence, inside his facilities, inside his
> rooms,” said George J. Tenet, the former director of the CIA,
> describing that period to an audience last year.
>
> A former U.S. intelligence officer said the CIA and National Security
> Agency were focused on the Khan network and collecting important
> pieces of the puzzle, but both agencies argued for caution out of a
> strong desire to protect sources and methods.
>
> “In the NSA’s case, we could be talking about the potential compromise
> of a collection system costing millions of dollars or a specific,
> crucial source that would be evident if the information were acted
> on,” the former officer said.
>
> The best public source of information for what intelligence agencies
> were learning at the time is a report issued in July by a British
> government commission. Two U.S. officials described the report as an
> accurate reflection of information shared between the CIA and its
> British equivalent, MI6.
>
> By April 2000, intelligence showed that Khan was supplying uranium
> enrichment equipment to at least one customer in the Middle East,
> thought to be Libya, the report says. Five months later, intelligence
> operatives learned that the network was mass producing centrifuge
> components for a major project.
>
> When the new Bush administration came into office in January 2001, the
> CIA briefed officials at the National Security Council on the dangers
> posed by Khan. The NSC officials recognized the threat as well as the
> need to get as much information as possible before acting, said two
> people involved in the talks.
>
> “The suspicion was that the intelligence guys were all about reporting
> and watching and they had to overcome that,” said Richard Falkenrath,
> an NSC staff member at the time. “The other question was, ‘What would
> we do about Khan, what would Pakistan tolerate?’ “
>
> Throughout 2001, the CIA and MI6 tracked Khan’s activities. A
> comprehensive assessment in March 2002 concluded that Khan’s network
> had moved its base to Dubai and established production facilities in
> Malaysia.
>
> A few months later, new information led the agencies to conclude that
> Khan’s network was central to a Libyan nuclear weapons program.
>
> By January 2003, the British were concerned that “Khan’s activities
> had now reached the point where it would be dangerous to allow them to
> go on,” the report says.
>
> Libyan officials later would tell the Americans and British that Khan
> had delivered the warhead plans to them in late 2001 or early 2002.
> Wolf, the former assistant secretary of State, said he was unsure
> whether the Americans or British knew about the plans until after the
> Libyans decided to give up their nuclear ambitions.
>
> Even as the danger mounted, there was a new constraint on action. The
> terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001,
> had restored Pakistan as a vital ally, and U.S. officials were
> reluctant to take any step that might jeopardize the fight against Al
> Qaeda and the Taliban.
>
> *
>
> Unraveling the Network
>
> The endgame for Khan began in March 2003. Seif Islam, Kadafi’s elder
> son, approached an MI6 agent in London with an offer to talk about
> rumors that Libya possessed weapons of mass destruction, several
> officials briefed on the episode said.
>
> Intelligence agents from the CIA and MI6 held sporadic talks with the
> head of Libyan intelligence, Mousa Kusa, through the spring and
> summer. The U.S. and Britain wanted Libya to give up its chemical
> weaponry and nuclear technology, and Kadafi wanted assurances that in
> return economic sanctions hobbling its economy would be removed.
>
> In August, with the issue still unresolved, British intelligence got a
> tip about a shipment that would be leaving Khan’s factory in Malaysia
> for Libya. U.S. spy satellites tracked the shipment, and the vessel
> was eventually diverted by U.S. and Italian authorities to an Italian
> port, where five crates of delicate centrifuge components were unloaded.
>
> U.S. officials involved in the episode said the interception finally
> persuaded the Libyan leader to give up his weapons programs, a
> decision Kadafi announced on Dec. 19, 2003.
>
> As part of the deal, teams from the U.S., Britain and the
> International Atomic Energy Agency arrived in Libya in January 2004 to
> dismantle the 500 tons of nuclear equipment that Khan’s network had
> shipped there. The most sensitive material was loaded onto a U.S.
> military cargo plane that had been stripped of its identifying marks
> and flown nonstop to the national weapons laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tenn.
>
> Among the items on the plane was a sealed pouch containing the warhead
> designs, said people involved in the shipment.
>
> The two nuclear weapons specialists who examined the top-secret plans
> said the Libyans had handed them over in two plastic shopping bags.
> They said identifying marks had been removed but the designs were
> clearly for a warhead tested by China in 1966 and later provided to
> Pakistan.
>
> One bag contained about 100 production drawings for fabricating the
> warhead; the other held hundreds of pages of handwritten notes and
> unclassified documents from sources such as the U.S. Department of Energy.
>
> The notes, written in English by at least four people, were numbered
> sequentially and appeared to be the detailed records of a year-long
> seminar given long ago by Chinese experts to Pakistanis on how to
> build the warhead, the experts said.
>
> Even before Kadafi made his announcement, U.S. officials had
> confronted Musharraf with the Libyan evidence against Khan, leaving
> the Pakistani leader with little choice but to act.
>
> But Khan remained too popular — and Musharraf’s grip on power too
> tenuous — for a public arrest. Instead, Khan was placed under house
> arrest and made a brief televised confession on Feb. 4, 2004, and he
> was pardoned immediately.
>
> Since then, Pakistan has kept Khan outside the reach of investigators,
> leaving many questions about the proliferation network unanswered.
>
> In one troubling discovery, investigators and customs officials in
> Europe say they recently found signs that elements of the network had
> resumed work. This time, the client again is Pakistan, which
> investigators suspect is trying to get material for a new generation
> of centrifuges.
>
> “With Pakistan today, it’s hard to know how much they need, but
> already a couple of items have been stopped very recently, including a
> shipment of high-strength aluminum for centrifuges,” an investigator said.
>
> In the meantime, Congress has approved and funded a request for a
> three-year, $3-billion package of economic and military assistance to
> Pakistan, which remains a key ally in the Bush administration’s war on
> terrorism.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ********************************************************************
> Please inform those interested in Afghanistan to join the
> Afghaniyat Listserver Newsgroup, Afghanistan’s Largest Email
> Newsgroup with over 3600 members worldwide.
>
> By joining the server, you will recieve “One Daily Digest” containing
> news articles, essays, announcements from Afghanistan officials, international
experts,and Afghans worldwide.
> ===================================================================
> TO SUBSCRIBE
> Send an email to: afghaniyat-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
> *********************************************************************
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
> To visit your group on the web, go to:
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>
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
> afghaniyat-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
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>
>
>

fwd: PIPELINES OR PIPE DREAMS?

This is another article indicating the race to develop an infrastructure linking
various parts of Greater Central Asia. RLCPlease see my “concerns” page:
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~canfrobt/Concerns
My blog: http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/Forwarded Message:

From: Rasul Mobin
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: PIPELINES OR PIPE DREAMS?
Date: Feb 27, 2005
–>
>
> RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
> ________________________________________________________
> RFE/RL Afghanistan Report
> Vol. 4, No. 7, 25 February 2005
>
>
>
> SPECIAL FEATURES
>
> PIPELINES OR PIPE DREAMS?
>
> By Amin Tarzi and Daniel Kimmage
>
> The on-again, off-again prospects of the
> Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural-Gas Pipeline Project (TAP)
> have come alive once more with a recent decision by India’s
> cabinet to authorize discussion of three pipeline routes to India,
> including TAP. Without the Indian market, TAP was not deemed a
> profitable undertaking. But even if New Delhi and Islamabad come to a
> full agreement on the project, and Kabul’s enthusiasm remains at
> current levels, a multitude of other problems could render the
> pipeline no more than a pipe dream.
> First envisaged in 1991, TAP is designed to transport natural
> gas from the Dawlatabad fields in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan
> into Pakistan and eventually to India. The initial phase of the
> project, excluding the pipeline’s possible extension to India,
> would involve the construction of a pipeline about 1,700 kilometers
> in length, mostly through Afghan territory, that can transport up to
> 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.
> The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which has financed a
> feasibility study for the project, has estimated that the
> Turkmenistan-to-Pakistan section of the pipeline would cost between
> $2 billion-$2.5 billion and would require four years of construction
> after all decisions are taken by the cooperating countries and
> international financial institutions (see “RFE/RL Afghanistan
> Report,” 27 February 2003).
> According to a 14 February report by “International Oil
> Daily,” ADB officials have confirmed that the TAP pipeline is
> “economically and financially a viable project.” While Turkmenistan
> has yet to submit a certification of its Dawlatabad gas reserves, an
> unidentified ADB source quoted on 1 February by “Platts Energy
> Economist” said that the Turkmen side is expected to deliver the
> needed certification by March.
>
> India’s Geostrategic Fears
>
> On the receiving end, India’s reluctance to rely on gas
> from a pipeline crossing the territory of archrival Pakistan had
> proved to be a major stumbling block. However, the recent
> authorization given by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for his
> country to explore several possibilities to transport much-needed
> natural gas to India has rekindled interest in the TAP project.
> Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar told reporters
> in January that by looking at the region’s map “you may accuse me
> of dreaming, but as a minister I am paid to dream.” Aiyar added, “We
> have the Bangladesh-Burma [Myanmar] pipeline, we are looking at a
> pipeline from Iran that would cross Pakistan, and we want a pipeline
> from Turkmenistan that would cross Afghanistan and Pakistan,” “Platts
> Energy Economist” reported on 1 February.
> Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose country is eager to get
> the TAP project under way, told visiting Indian External Affairs
> Minister Kunwar Natwar Singh on 15 February that his country hopes
> New Delhi will look favorably at the trans-Afghan pipeline. A press
> release from Karzai’s office indicated that pipeline would bring
> “significant economic benefit to Afghanistan and the region.”
> But before Karzai and his Indian and Pakistani partners begin
> to celebrate economic prosperity and a constructive new phase in the
> elusive New Delhi-Islamabad partnership, several stumbling blocks
> need to be cleared.
>
> The Security Issue
>
> Afghanistan’s security remains a major question,
> especially if the U.S.-led coalition forces and the NATO-led
> International Security Assistance Force begin to withdraw from that
> country. Beyond interim security, which could be provided by
> Provincial Reconstruction Teams under ISAF command, and perhaps air
> patrols by Afghanistan’s future military partners, Kabul needs to
> extend its legal and physical authority throughout the pipeline
> route.
> Currently there are two routes under discussion. The first
> runs through northern Afghanistan, cutting through Kabul before
> entering Pakistan; the second travels through western Afghanistan,
> passing through Kandahar into Pakistan.
> Unfortunately, security concerns extend beyond Afghanistan.
> If the route through western Afghanistan emerges as the best option,
> the pipeline would cross Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province. In
> January, a little-known separatist group attacked a gas-storage
> facility in Baluchistan. The attack was not unique, as local
> tribesmen increasingly are targeting natural-gas facilities in the
> province to settle accounts with the central government, ask for
> higher royalties, or promote their nationalist agendas.
> If the alternative option is chosen, the pipeline would cross
> the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, which includes
> the semi-autonomous tribal areas. These regions, most notably the
> tribal areas, are known for their fierce independence. Both the NWFP
> and the adjoining Afghan border regions are also home to radical
> Islamists groups with very strong anti-India sentiments. A pipeline
> serving Indian interests would present them with a tempting target.
>
> Turkmenistan’s Price Hikes
>
> Turkmenistan’s relations with Russia are another variable
> in the complex equation that will determine the gas-rich Central
> Asian country’s future deals. As RFE/RL has noted (“RFE/RL
> Central Asia Report,” 2 December 2004), Turkmenistan has signed a
> 25-year “gradual increase” contract with state-controlled Russian gas
> company Gazprom under which Russia’s purchases of Turkmen gas
> will rise from roughly 7 billion cubic meters in 2005 to 70
> billion-80 billion cubic meters by 2009.
> But the Russian-Turkmen relationship has been showing signs
> of strain lately. In early January, Turkmenistan strong-armed Ukraine
> into accepting a price hike, raising the price of gas from $44 per
> 1,000 cubic meters to $58. Fighting for similar gains on the Russian
> front, Turkmenistan shut off gas shipments to Russia in January.
> Gazprom head Aleksei Miller met with Turkmen President Saparmurat
> Niyazov in Ashgabat on 10 February, but their talks were
> inconclusive. Although Gazprom stated in a press release after the
> meeting that the two sides agreed to “follow existing agreements,”
> Turkmenistan’s official news agency stressed that the current
> price — $44 per 1,000 cubic meters, paid half in cash and half in
> kind — is “unacceptable,” Russia’s “Vremya novostei” reported on
> 14 February. Further talks are expected.
> However Gazprom and Turkmenistan resolve the price dispute,
> the Turkmen government’s desire to force the renegotiation of an
> existing contract, not to mention the hardball negotiating tactics
> implicit in the shutoff of gas shipments to Russia, are a cautionary
> lesson to other would-be partners. Moreover, Gazprom has its own
> concerns about Turkmenistan’s gas reserves. As “Nefte Compass”
> reported on 20 January, Gazprom is waiting to see an audit of Turkmen
> gas reserves conducted by Texas-based DeGolyer and MacNoughton before
> investing in an upgrade of the Central Asia Center pipeline.
> Gazprom, which has contracted to buy large amounts of Turkmen
> gas to cover for declining yields at its existing fields against a
> backdrop of fearsome development costs for new fields in Siberia, is
> likely to take a dim view of any alternate export routes for
> Turkmenistan. State-controlled Gazprom provides a steady stream of
> revenues to the Russian budget, and the Kremlin can be expected to
> safeguard its interests. An anonymous oil-industry source told RBC on
> 18 January that the Russian gas company Itera, which at one point
> considered involvement in TAP, might have disassociated itself from
> the project because it “was not supported by Russian authorities.”
> India, now drawing attention with its interest in TAP, may
> also be looking to expand its ties with the Russian energy sector,
> and specifically Gazprom. Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar
> Aiyar is expected in Moscow on 21 February for talks that will focus
> on a possible agreement between India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp.
> (ONGC) and Gazprom to cooperate on natural-gas extraction projects in
> both Russia and India, Reuters reported. ONGC has also been
> conducting talks about the possibility of acquiring a stake in
> Yuganskneftegaz, the Yukos production asset state-owned Rosneft
> recently plucked from the ruins of erstwhile oil oligarch Mikhail
> Khodorkovskii’s empire. Should India cement its links to big
> state-owned players in Russia’s energy industry, Moscow could
> increase its leverage over a potential TAP participant, rendering the
> dream of riches for Kabul and peace and energy for New Delhi and
> Islamabad a mere pipe dream.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ********************************************************************
> Please inform those interested in Afghanistan to join the
> Afghaniyat Listserver Newsgroup, Afghanistan’s Largest Email
> Newsgroup with over 3600 members worldwide.
>
> By joining the server, you will recieve “One Daily Digest” containing
> news articles, essays, announcements from Afghanistan officials, international
experts,and Afghans worldwide.
> ===================================================================
> TO SUBSCRIBE
> Send an email to: afghaniyat-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
> *********************************************************************
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
> To visit your group on the web, go to:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/afghaniyat/
>
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
> afghaniyat-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
> http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
>
>
>

Is Truth a matter of political correctness?

This article is reason for great concern. The rewriting of history has become, in this case, a tool by which to not only misrepresent the truth but to define the present situation. As Cohen says, it is a call to action. Can this be? RLC

EDITORIAL OBSERVER

The Difference Between Politically Incorrect and Historically Wrong

By ADAM COHEN

Published: January 26, 2005


I f you’re going to call a book “The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History,” readers will expect some serious carrying on about race, and Thomas Woods Jr. does not disappoint. He fulminates against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, best known for forcing restaurants and bus stations in the Jim Crow South to integrate, and against Brown v. Board of Education. And he offers up some curious views on the Civil War – or “the War of Northern Aggression,” a name he calls “much more accurate.”The introduction bills the book as an effort to “set the record straight,” but it is actually an attempt to push the record far to the right. More than a history, it is a checklist of arch-conservative talking points. The New Deal public works programs that helped millions survive the Depression were a “disaster,” and Social Security “damaged the economy.” The Marshall Plan, which lifted up devastated European nations after World War II, was a “failed giveaway program.” And the long-discredited theory of “nullification,” which held that states could suspend federal laws, “isn’t as crazy as it sounds.”It is tempting to dismiss the book as fringe scholarship, not worth worrying about, but the numbers say otherwise. It is being snapped up on college campuses and, helped along by plugs from Fox News and other conservative media, it recently soared to No. 8 on the New York Times paperback nonfiction best-seller list. It is part of a boomlet in far-right attacks on mainstream history that includes books like Jim Powell’s “FDR’s Folly,” which argues that Franklin Roosevelt made the Depression worse, and Michelle Malkin’s “In Defense of Internment,” a warm look back on the mass internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.It is not surprising, in the current political climate, that liberal pieties are being challenged, and many of them ought to be. But the latest revisionist histories are disturbing both because they are so extreme – even Ronald Reagan called the Japanese internment a “grave wrong” and signed a reparations law – and because they seem intent on distorting the past to promote dangerous policies today. If Social Security contributed to the Depression, it makes sense to get rid of it now. If internment was a good thing in 1942, think what it could do in 2005. And if the 14th Amendment, which guarantees minorities “equal protection of the law,” was never properly ratified – as Mr. Woods argues – racial discrimination may be constitutional after all.At the start of the “Politically Incorrect Guide to American History,” Mr. Woods says he is not trying to offer “a complete overview of American history.” That frees him to write a book in which major historical events that do not fit his biases are omitted, in favor of minutiae that do. The book has nothing to say about the Trail of Tears, in which a fifth of the Cherokee population was wiped out, or similar massacres, but cheerfully points out that “by its second decade Harvard College welcomed Indian students.”The “Politically Incorrect Guide” is full of dubious assertions, small and large. It makes a perverse, but ideologically loaded, linguistic argument that the American Civil War was not actually a civil war, a point with which dictionaries disagree. More troubling are the book’s substantive distortions of history, like its claim that the infamous Black Codes, passed by the Southern states after the Civil War, were hardly different from Northern anti-vagrancy laws. The Black Codes – which were aimed, as the Columbia University historian Eric Foner has noted, at keeping freed slaves’ status as close to slavery as possible – went well beyond anything in the North.The book reads less like history than a call to action, since so many of its historical arguments track the current political agenda of the far right. It contends that federal courts were never given the power to strike down state laws, a pet cause of states’ rights supporters today. And it maintains that the First Amendment applies only to the federal government, and therefore does not prohibit the states from imposing religion on their citizens, a view that Clarence Thomas has suggested in his church-state opinions.Most ominously, it makes an elaborate argument that the 14th Amendment was “never constitutionally ratified” because of irregularities in how it was adopted. This, too, is a pet cause of the fringe right, one the Supreme Court has rejected. If it prevailed, it would undo Brown v. Board of Education and many other rulings barring discrimination based on race, religion and sex. But Mr. Woods does not carry his argument to its logical conclusion. If the 14th Amendment was not properly ratified, neither, it would seem, was the 13th, which was adopted under similar circumstances, and slavery should be legal.These revisionist historians have started meeting pockets of resistance from those who believe they are rewriting reality to suit an ideological agenda. A group called Progress for America recently produced an ad that, incredibly, used Franklin Roosevelt’s picture to support President Bush’s plan to privatize Social Security. But Progress for America lost the public relations war when James Roosevelt Jr., F.D.R.’s grandson, announced that his grandfather “would surely oppose the ideas now being promoted by this administration.” Then there was the large Christian school in North Carolina that assigned its students a booklet called “Southern Slavery: As It Was.” At first, the school argued that the booklet – which describes slavery as “a relationship based upon mutual affection and confidence” – simply provided a valuable “Southern perspective.” But after North Carolina newspapers reported on its contents, and quoted local pastors expressing their concern, the school quietly withdrew the text last month, apologizing for the “oversight.”

fwd: One in four Afghan children dies before fifth birthday

On conditions in Afghanistan. RLC

Forwarded Message:

From: Rasul Mobin
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: One in four Afghan children dies before fifth birthday
Date: Jan 19, 2005

>
>
> The Independent (london)
> One in four Afghan children dies before fifth birthday
> By Maxine Frith
> 18 January 2005
>
>
> Afghanistan has one of the poorest records in the world for women andch ildren’s health. And despite the grand promises made to post-war Afghanistan, there is no sign of improvement any time soon.
>
> Unicef says 1,600 women per 100,000 die in childbirth in Afghanistan; in the UK, the rate is 16 per 100,000. In the most remote areas the maternal mortality rate is 6,000 per 100,000, meaning that 6 per cent of women die during labour.
>
> Even if mother and baby survive, their prospects are dismal. One in four children dies before their fifth birthday; in most Western countries, the rate is fewer than 30 per 1,000 live births.
>
> The 26 million people have just 900 clinics for reproductive health and childbirth. Charities and aid agencies have been frustrated that the Millennium Development Goals did not directly address the issue of reproductive health.
>
> The US refuses to fund organisations promoting abortion. Lucy Palmer, support manager for the sexual health charity Marie Stopes International in south Asia, said: “Because of the work we do on abortion, we have to rely on European partners.
>
> “The Americans had committed a lot of money to a basic healthcare package in Afghanistan which would have given women better access to services, but just before the elections the cash was diverted to building roads.
>
> “Contraception is not illegal in Afghanistan but women only have access to these services if there is a clinic two or three kilometres away, and for most that is not the case.”
>
> Chronic shortages of trained doctors, midwives and hospitals also mean most women who develop complications during labour are likely to die.
>
> Ms Palmer added: “[We] are struggling just to get our teams out ther and working. The country needs a national training centre for doctors and midwives.”

Attack Iran? Cole thinks so

The following is from Juan Cole: www.juancole.com Jan 18, 05

His comments on Hersh’s article help me to have some perspective on the article. In fact, it is incredible to me that the Bush administration would still be thinking about Iran. I can’t really believe that they want to attack Iran. It would have been a blunder when they first declared Iran part of the Axis of Evil and a folly beyond imagination now. I hope Hersh and Cole are

wrong. RLC

JUAN COLE, JAN 18,05

The Accountability Moment and Hersh on Iran

Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh threw Washington, Islamabad and Tehran into consternation Monday with his report in the New Yorker on the activities of Bush’s Pentagon with regard to Iran. He said that the Pentagon had already sent some special ops teams into Iran to look for evidence of a nuclear weapons program, with Pakistani help. Bush used the Pentagon instead of the CIA, Hersh alleged, because Bush maintains that there are no reporting requirements with regard to Congress this way. Using the CIA would have required informing the Senate Intelligence Committee, by law. Probably Pentagon intelligence gathering falls under the same statute, but that is an untested theory and for the moment Rumsfeld is acting as though the Pentagon is unconstrained.

I don’t think there is any doubt that Bush and his appointees at the head of the Department of Defense intend to do something to Iran. If Iraq had gone well, they probably would already have attacked it. Since their land army is tied down in Iraq, they have to use special operations forces for aggressive action against Iran. The Pentagon and also Pakistan are denying the report

heatedly. But it makes sense. Iran has formed a close military alliance with India, Pakistan’s chief rival in South Asia, and Iran has come out on top in the new Afghanistan, with Tajik and Hazarah allies displacing the largely Pushtun, Pakistan-oriented Taliban. And Pakistan has reason not to want Iran to get nukes, thus surrounding Pakistan with nuclear powers on both the east and the south. So Pakistan has every reason to cooperate with the US against Iran.

As for Bush and his DoD hawks, they have been quite clear about their intentions. They announced that Iraq and Iran were part of an axis of evil, and we have already seen what happens to regimes so categorized.

The potential for trouble for the United States if the Bush administration acts aggressively toward Iran is enormous. It could turn the Iraqi Shiites and the Afghan Hazarahs decisively against Washington. An Iran in chaos similar to that in Iraq would be three or four times the problem for the US and the world that Iraq is.

Ironically, Bush revealed the day before Hersh’s article that he has learned nothing from his mistakes in Iraq.

Bush’s comments in the Washington Post on Sunday that he did not need to fire anybody over his Iraq policy because the US electorate had endorsed that policy cause a political uproar.

‘ “We had an accountability moment, and that’s called the 2004 election,” he was reported as saying. “The American people listened to different assessments made about what was taking place in Iraq, and they looked at the two candidates and chose me, for which I’m grateful.” ‘

Bush doesn’t seem to know the difference between getting a mandate to lead and getting a mandate to continue failed policies. Those Americans who voted for Bush often did so, according to polls, despite worries that Iraq wasn’t going well. They didn’t put him back in to just keep on making the same stupid mistakes. They put him back in in hopes that he had been seasoned by the errors and was committed enough to the project to see it through properly.

That is why he should have fired the top three officials at the Department of Defense, to signal that he was going to make a course correction.

Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith don’t know how to fix the Iraq mess, and don’t even seem to pay much attention to the problems. In testimony before Congress last spring, Wolfowitz grossly underestimated the number of US troops that had been killed in the guerrilla war.

Rumsfeld either was involved in the decision to put the US into the torture business, or didn’t keep watch on subordinates who did make that decision. Either way, he goes down in history as the Marquis de Sade of Abu Ghraib. He didn’t know that it would only have taken a phone call to increase the number of armored vehicles sent to our troops in Iraq. And, when he was asked about the difficulties of holding elections in Iraq, he said it would be all right if the polls couldn’t be held in some areas of the country. He did not know that his subordinate, Paul Bremer, had set the elections up as national and proportional, so that if one region with a major ethnic group did not vote, it would end up not being represented in parliament. (Rumsfeld seems to have though it was like the US, where if you have a light turnout in a district, you still get a congressman, he or she just doesn’t represent much of the electorate). He should be fired.

Afghan judge arrested for Kabul bombing

———- Forwarded message ———-
Date: Sat, 08 Jan 2005 09:13:54 -0000
From: Musa Paktiawal
Reply-To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Afghan judge arrested for Kabul bombing

08 Jan 2005 07:24:16 GMT
Afghan judge arrested for Kabul bombing
By Sayed Salahuddin

KABUL, Jan 8 (Reuters) – Afghan security forces have detained a
supreme court judge suspected of being involved in an August car bomb
attack that killed 10 people, including three Americans, in the
capital Kabul, a court official said on Saturday.

The attack targeted offices used by the private U.S. security firm
DynCorp, which provides protection to President Hamid Karzai and
gives anti-narcotics training to Afghan police.

A supreme court official said the arrest of Judge Naqibullah followed
the interrogation of two al Qaeda members detained this month for the
bombing.

“The security forces several days ago arrested Naqibullah as an
accused over the bombing incident,” Wahid Mozhda, a spokesman for the
supreme court, told Reuters.

“They said the other two suspects had also said that they had spent a
night at Naqibullah’s house in Kabul.”

Naqibullah also served as the head of the preliminary court of a
district of Panj Sher province to the northeast of the capital, the
official said.

He belonged to a faction of the Mujahideen, or holy warriors, which
fought the 1980s Soviet occupation and then the Taliban from the late
1990s, helping U.S.-led forces topple them in 2001.

Security forces said they discovered explosives during a raid on
Naqibullah’s house, Mozhda said.

The Taliban, ousted from power in 2001 for harbouring al Qaeda and
its chief, Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the bombing
and the suicide attack.

Bin Laden is the architect of Sept. 11 attacks on U.S. cities and his
whereabouts remain a mystery, though officials speculate that he is
hiding somewhere along the rugged border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.

Taliban remnants and their al Qaeda allies are mostly active in parts
of southern and eastern Afghanistan.

********************************************************************
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Afghaniyat Listserver Newsgroup, Afghanistan’s Largest Email
Newsgroup with over 3300 members worldwide.

By joining the server, you will recieve “One Daily Digest” containing
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===================================================================
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*********************************************************************
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fwd: Afghan judge arrested for Kabul bombing

Very interesting. One never knows what is actually happening out there. Things
are never what they seem. Best, RLC

Please see my “concerns” page:
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~canfrobt/Concerns
My blog: http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/

Forwarded Message:

From: Musa Paktiawal
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Afghan judge arrested for Kabul bombing
Date: Jan 8, 2005

>
>
> 08 Jan 2005 07:24:16 GMT
> Afghan judge arrested for Kabul bombing
> By Sayed Salahuddin
>
> KABUL, Jan 8 (Reuters) – Afghan security forces have detained a
> supreme court judge suspected of being involved in an August car bomb
> attack that killed 10 people, including three Americans, in the
> capital Kabul, a court official said on Saturday.
>
> The attack targeted offices used by the private U.S. security firm
> DynCorp, which provides protection to President Hamid Karzai and
> gives anti-narcotics training to Afghan police.
>
> A supreme court official said the arrest of Judge Naqibullah followed
> the interrogation of two al Qaeda members detained this month for the
> bombing.
>
> “The security forces several days ago arrested Naqibullah as an
> accused over the bombing incident,” Wahid Mozhda, a spokesman for the
> supreme court, told Reuters.
>
> “They said the other two suspects had also said that they had spent a
> night at Naqibullah’s house in Kabul.”
>
> Naqibullah also served as the head of the preliminary court of a
> district of Panj Sher province to the northeast of the capital, the
> official said.
>
> He belonged to a faction of the Mujahideen, or holy warriors, which
> fought the 1980s Soviet occupation and then the Taliban from the late
> 1990s, helping U.S.-led forces topple them in 2001.
>
> Security forces said they discovered explosives during a raid on
> Naqibullah’s house, Mozhda said.
>
> The Taliban, ousted from power in 2001 for harbouring al Qaeda and
> its chief, Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the bombing
> and the suicide attack.
>
> Bin Laden is the architect of Sept. 11 attacks on U.S. cities and his
> whereabouts remain a mystery, though officials speculate that he is
> hiding somewhere along the rugged border between Afghanistan and
> Pakistan.
>
> Taliban remnants and their al Qaeda allies are mostly active in parts
> of southern and eastern Afghanistan.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ********************************************************************
> Please inform those interested in Afghanistan to join the
> Afghaniyat Listserver Newsgroup, Afghanistan’s Largest Email
> Newsgroup with over 3300 members worldwide.
>
> By joining the server, you will recieve “One Daily Digest” containing
> news articles, essays, announcements from Afghanistan officials, international
experts,and Afghans worldwide.
> ===================================================================
> TO SUBSCRIBE
> Send an email to: afghaniyat-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
> *********************************************************************
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
> To visit your group on the web, go to:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/afghaniyat/
>
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
> afghaniyat-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
> http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
>
>
>

fwd: The war for Afghans’ hearts: After years of hostility toward foreign troops, the

As indicated in an earlier note, it is always hard to tell how strong one or
another so-called public sentiment is among a group of people, so this is to be
read with some reserve, but it is promising news in so far as it is true. RLC

Please see my “concerns” page:
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~canfrobt/Concerns
My blog: http://rcanfield.blogspot.com/

Forwarded Message:

From: Rasul Mobin
To: afghaniyat@yahoogroups.com
Subject: The war for Afghans’ hearts: After years of hostility toward foreign
troops, the
Date: Jan 9, 2005

>
>
> Ottawa Citizen
> January 9, 2005
> The war for Afghans’ hearts: After years of hostility toward foreign
> troops, the people of Kandahar have finally warmed up and are helping
> the soldiers
> by Jim Farrell, The Edmonton Journal
>
>
> If Canadian troops move from Kabul back to Kandahar next year — and
> it appears likely they will — the Canadians will find a changed city
> and an American-run base that is almost unrecognizable.
>
> When Canadian troops served alongside Americans from January to
> August of 2002, occasional firefights erupted around the perimeter of
> the airport where they were stationed. In the city and surrounding
> villages, locals tended to be standoffish. Every soldier was aware
> that Kandahar was the birthplace of the Taliban.
>
> The Kandahar base now features wooden huts where row upon row of four-
> person tents once stood. Cyclone fencing topped with razor wire,
> rather than soldiers dug into trenches, provides security. The
> southeast corner of the camp, once featureless desert, is a vast
> storage area of steel cargo containers. Where soldiers once carted
> away steel drums of human waste from improvised outhouses, civilian
> workers scrub down full-service bathrooms.
>
> But the most significant change is found in the city of Kandahar and
> the surrounding countryside, where most children now wave or give
> thumbs-up to patrolling American troops. Their fathers often smile as
> armoured Humvees flying the Stars and Stripes motor by.
>
> “Down here in Kandahar the sharp end has been somewhat blunted,” Maj.
> David Flynn of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Battalion, 7th Field Artillery
> said.
>
> There are still incidents of roadside booby-trap bombs and rockets
> lobbed toward the city, but these incidents are more common in Kabul,
> the capital city 500 kilometres to the northeast.
>
> “We have been successful in interdicting improvised explosive devices
> (booby traps) thanks largely to locals tipping us off about people
> out to cause trouble,” says Maj. Flynn. “Our message is getting out
> and people are assisting the command.”
>
> That matters to Canadians because Afghanistan’s defence minister has
> proposed that Canadian troops move from Kabul to Kandahar in February
> 2006 to provide security for Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
> civilian/military groups that will stabilize the area and aid
> reconstruction.
>
> If Canadians return to Kandahar, they will receive a warm welcome
> from the local populace, Maj. Flynn says.
>
> “Generally we have exceeded my expectations,” he says. “People are
> happy to be able to go back to their homes. They are happy their
> children are going back to school. These people are tired of war.”
>
> That seemed to be the case when Lieut. Noel Bergeron led a patrol of
> four Humvees around and through Kandahar to show the flag and drop in
> on local police headquarters. On their maps, they named the local
> roads after beers — such as Michelob, Labatts, Rolling Rock, Amstel,
> Killians, Heineken, Bud Lite and Molson Ice.
>
> Levity aside, as he prepared to drive down a road named for a
> forbidden beer, Lieut. Bergeron cautioned his soldiers.
>
> “It’s never a routine patrol,” he told them.
>
> As the convoy hit the first mud-walled desert village south of
> Kandahar, children rushed to the roadside, waving and giving the
> thumbs-up signal.
>
> “We’ve also taught them the Hawaiian shaka,” Lieut. Bergeron says,
> extending the thumb and small finger of one hand in the ‘be cool’
> surfer salute to illustrate what he means.
>
> The convoy stops at a 44-man station on the northern rim of the city.
> Police chief Manan Khan, a member of the Alokozie tribe, runs it.
>
> “Most district police chiefs are Alokozie because the police chief of
> Kandahar province is Alokozie,” Lieut. Bergeron says. “It works
> better that way.”
>
> He makes notes in a small black book as Manan Khan explains his
> peacekeeping problems. Most involve members of the Afghan Militia
> Force — the old Afghan army — breaking into houses or robbing
> people at gunpoint. Lieut. Bergeron explains that will soon stop. The
> program to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate members of the Afghan
> militia into the civilian population is under way.
>
> There is also a campaign to register all guns — primarily AK-47
> assault rifles. Families may keep those weapons in their homes for
> self-defence, but they won’t be allowed to take them into the streets.
>
> “It’s just like Montana,” says Lieut. Bergeron. “Everyone here has a
> gun but soon the police will be the only ones carrying AK-47s.”
>
> As Lieut. Bergeron prepares to leave, Manan Khan tells him that
> everyone must learn to be patient.
>
> “Afghanistan was not broken in just 30 days so it will not be fixed
> in one day,” he says through an interpreter.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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